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1. Introduction 
In most countries, public wage bills represent a large share of public expenditure (about 55 percent 
on average in 2009). For this reason, governments that make fiscal adjustments ought to have a 
hold on the level of their public wage bills (Alesina and Perotti, 1995).  In this paper, we analyze 
the adjustment of public wage bills and public deficits over business and political cycles. We 
examine how the transparency of governments,1 the freedom of the press, the union coverage, the 
political regime (parliamentary versus presidential)2 and the electoral rule (majoritarian versus 
proportional) influence the ability to adjust public wage bills.3  
Our main results are well illustrated by two countries. In Greece, the share of public wage bill in 
GDP increased from 9.6 percent in 1996 to 12.2 percent in 2008. During the same period, public 
deficit averaged 4.9 percent of GDP. Strikingly, increases in the share of public wage bill in GDP 
occurred when the output gap was positive rather than negative. In Denmark, the share of public 
wage bill in GDP averaged 17.4 percent over the same period. It is much higher than in Greece! 
However, Denmark managed to control not only the evolution of the public wage bill, which 
remained stable, but also the public budget which exhibited an average positive surplus of 1.7 
percent of GDP. According to our findings, Greece is a typical example of a country where the 
weak transparency of the government and the lack of freedom of the press induce drifts of public 
wage bills during booms and election years that governments have no incentive to counteract when 
economic difficulties arise. At the opposite, in Denmark, transparency of public institutions and 
freedom of the press put pressure on governments to avoid unsustainable increases in public wage 
bills. All in all, our paper stresses that the transparency of the government and the freedom of the 
press contribute to prevent unsustainable increases in public wage bill.   
                                                          
1 Recent papers have connected economic policy with the transparency of governments. Alt and Lassen (2006) and Shi 
and Svensson (2006) show that electoral cycles in fiscal balances are more pronounced in countries with lower 
transparency. Gavazza and Lizzeri (2009) show that imperfect observability generates an incentive for politicians to 
offer excessive transfers partly financed through public deficits. Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) and Lane 
(2003) analyze the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy in OECD countries. Lane stresses that political economy factors 
play an important role in determining the degree of cyclicality in government spending across OECD countries, 
especially for wage government consumption. Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) argue that more corrupt 
countries display more procyclical fiscal policies because when more resources are available (i.e., in booms), the 
common-pool problem is more severe, and the fight over common resources intensifies, leading to budget deficits, this 
effect being stronger in more corrupt countries. 
2
 Persson (2002) finds that, empirically, presidential regimes are associated with smaller and less persistent responses of 
spending to income shocks, a stronger post-election cycle in aggregate spending and revenue, but a weaker cycle in 
social transfers. 
3 Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 9) argue that electoral cycles, showing up in spending or taxes, should be weaker 
under proportional representation compared to majority rules, because the incumbents' career concerns are stronger 
with individual accountability stemming from majority rules and because these concerns are at their strongest just 
before elections. 
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We start out by describing the relations between public deficits and public wage bills. It turns out 
that there is no systematic cross-country relation between the share of public wage bills in GDP and 
the level of public deficits. There are very large cross-country differences in the share of public 
wage bills in terms of GDP, which ranges from 6.3 percent of GDP (Japan) to 17.5 percent of 
GDP (Denmark) over the 1990-2009 period. But countries with larger wage bills do not have 
necessarily larger public deficits. However, there is a strong positive within country correlation 
between public wage bills and public deficits, even when these two variables are averaged over five-
year periods. This indicates that public deficits tend to increase in countries where public wage bills 
increase faster than GDP.  
In order to describe more precisely the situations where there is lack of control of public wage bills, 
we define episodes of what we call “fiscal drift”, where there are simultaneous increases in the share 
of public wage bills in GDP and in public deficits. We interpret the occurrence of such episodes as 
the sign of a lack of control of public wage bills and public expenditure. We also look at episodes 
of “fiscal tightening”, where there are simultaneous decreases in the share of public wage bills in 
GDP and in public deficits. Such episodes occur when the control of public expenditure is 
sustained, at least partially, by a strong control of public wage bills.  
With these definitions in mind, we analyze in turn the probability that fiscal drift and fiscal 
tightening episodes appear. In doing so, we identify when these episodes occur around economic 
or political cycles, conditional to the degree of transparency of the government, the freedom of the 
press, the union coverage, the political regime and the electoral rule.  
Strikingly, we find that fiscal drift episodes do not come out more frequently during slumps, as 
could be expected, but during booms. This suggests that fiscal drift episodes are mostly induced by 
a perverse functioning of institutions. The fact that fiscal drift episodes are more frequent during 
election years reinforces the relevance of this interpretation. Consistently, we find that booms and 
election years significantly decrease the probability that fiscal tightening episodes come out. 
The analysis of the interactions between cycles and institutions allows us to shed more light on this 
phenomenon. We find that fiscal drift associated with booms are less frequent when governments 
are more transparent, when there is more freedom of the press and when the political regime is 
presidential, while larger union coverage tends to increase the probability of fiscal drift and 
decrease the probability of fiscal tightening. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the relation between public deficits and 
public wage bills in OECD countries over the last 15 years. Section 3 is devoted to the description 
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of fiscal drift and fiscal tightening episodes.  In section 4, we analyze the relations between the 
occurrence of fiscal drift and fiscal tightening episodes and the economic cycles, the election years, 
the transparency of governments, the freedom of the press, the union coverage, the political regime 
and the electoral rules.  
 
2.  Public wage bills and public deficits 
 
2.1. Data  
Public wage bills 
The definition of public wage bills hinges on the definition of the scope of the public sector. The 
public sector can comprise only general government employment, or general government and 
public corporations employment (legal entities that are owned or controlled by the government and 
produce most of their goods and services for sale in the market at economically significant prices).  
There are multiple national sources of data collection, and very few cross-country comparable data 
on public employment and public wage bills. Unfortunately, there is very limited cross country 
information on public employment.4 There is more information on public wage bills, thanks to the 
rules of accountability of general government expenditures. Public wage bills include the total 
compensation of employees of the general government sector, which comprises all levels of 
government (central, state, local and social security) and includes ministries, agencies and non-
profit institutions controlled by government.5 According to this definition, public wage bills do not 
include the compensation of employees in public corporations.  
Measures of public payroll as a share of GDP come from annual national accounts. The UN 
system of national accounts (SNA) is a set of internationally agreed recommendations to collect 
data with the latest operational revision dating from 1993. On this basis, homogeneous data for 
OECD countries are available on the period 1995-2009.6  
                                                          
4
 The OECD has recently released homogenous data on public employment now available for 1995, 2000, 2005 and 
2008 (Government at Glance) based on questionnaires that improve the comparability across country. The 
International Labor Organization also provides, in coordination with the OECD, such information extracted from a 
combination of different sources (administrative data or surveys) for a varying number of years depending on the 
country.  
5 Public wage bills do not include public pensions. 
6 There are homogeneous data for all countries since 1995 for most OECD countries, and some data from 1970 to 
1995 (few countries with observations as old as 1970, half of the countries with observations as old as 1980). 
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Unfortunately, the quality of data on public employment does not allow us to decompose changes 
in public wage bills into changes in employment and in remunerations. Data on wages and on 
employment do not overlap exactly. Moreover, even if it were the case, data on hours worked, or at 
least the share of part time jobs, would be needed to address this issue.  
Public deficit 
General government national accounts usually report net-lending/net-borrowing, which represents 
the amount the government has available to lend or must borrow to finance its non-financial 
operations. This figure comprises the interest payable for the service of the debt. Net lending data 
comes from the OECD annual SNA database. Data are available for most countries since 1980. 
2.2. Cross-country correlations between public wage bills and public deficits 
Figure 1 shows that there are large cross country differences in the share of public wage bill in 
GDP over the period 1995-2009. The average share of public wage bill in GDP goes from 6.4 
percent in Japan to 17.4 in Denmark. Public deficits are also very different across countries. 
Hungary is in the worst situation, with an average deficit equal to 6 percent of GDP. Over the 
same period, Norway had a positive net lending, equal to 11 percent of GDP.  
Figure 1 shows that there is no cross-country correlation between the share of public wage bill in 
GDP and public deficits, even though public wage bill represents a large share of public 
expenditure.  Scandinavian countries have the largest public wage bills associated with the largest 
positive net lending. At the opposite, Japan, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic have the 
smallest public wage bills but the largest public deficits. Overall, Figure 1 indicates that it is possible 
to have very large public sectors and sustainable public finances, but also very small public sectors 
and unsustainable public finances.  
2.3. Within-country correlations between public wage bills and public deficits 
Figure 2 shows that OECD countries have experienced very different changes over time in public 
wage bills and public deficits since the mid-nineties. There is no common general tendency across 
OECD countries. There is a negative trend in Austria, France, Germany, Israel, Luxembourg, 
Slovak Republic and Sweden. The trend is positive in Belgium, Greece, Ireland, United-Kingdom 
and United-States. Public wage bills fluctuate without showing any trend in other countries. There 
is also a strong increase in the share of wage bill in GDP in 2009 in most countries because the 
recession induced large drops in GDP in most countries.  
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Although there is no cross-country correlation between public wage bills and public deficits, it 
turns out that there is a strong correlation between these two variables over time within countries. 
Table 1 shows the within-country correlation between net public lending and public wage bills 
when these two variables are averaged over five year periods (i.e. 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-
2009). It turns out that there is a significant and sizeable correlation between these two variables, 
even when one controls for GDP growth, the share of population over 65 year old and below 15 
year old. One percentage point increase in the share of public wage bill in GDP is associated with 
1.5 percentage point decrease in net public lending.  
This correlation suggests that countries where the share of public wage bill in GDP has been 
increasing since the mid nineties have also experienced worsening public deficits. In the next 
section, we identify the features of the countries that experience worsening public deficits 
associated to increases in public wage bills. We also shed light on the features that enable countries 
to reduce their public deficits thanks to public wage bill compressions.  
 
3. Episodes of “fiscal drift” and “fiscal tightening” 
 
Even though larger public wage bills tend to be associated with lower net lending positions within 
countries, the fact that some countries with high levels of public employment do no experience 
large and recurrent deficits (e.g. Denmark or Sweden) raises the question about the ability to adjust 
the size of public administration when it becomes necessary. To study this type of adjustment we 
look at “bad” episodes, where both deficits and wage spending increase, but also at “good” 
episodes, where both deficits and wage spending decrease.  
 
3.1. Definition of “fiscal drift” and “fiscal tightening” episodes 
Fiscal drift episodes 
A fiscal drift episode induced by public wage bill drift is a situation where there are simultaneous 
increases in the GDP share of public wage bill and in the GDP share of public deficit. Obviously, 
by definition, there is necessarily a public deficit during such fiscal drift episodes (i.e. a negative 
public net lending during and at the end of the episode, but not necessarily at the beginning). We 
consider two different definitions of fiscal drift.  
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There is a “short fiscal drift episode” if there are simultaneous increases in the GDP shares of 
public wage bill and public deficit during at least one year. There are 105 fiscal drift episodes over 
308 country/year observations with public deficits available for the OECD countries over the 
period 1995-2009.  
The second definition is more restrictive: “long fiscal drift episodes” occur if there are 
simultaneous increases in the GDP shares of public wage bill and public deficit during at least two 
years. Such fiscal drift episodes occur for 60 country/year observations.  
Fiscal tightening episodes 
A fiscal tightening episode induced by public wage bill policy is a situation where there are 
simultaneous decreases in the GDP share of public wage bill and in the GDP share of public 
deficit. By definition, there is a public deficit at the beginning of fiscal tightening episodes (i.e. in 
the year preceding the episode). As for fiscal drifts, there are two different definitions of fiscal 
tightening.  
There is a “short fiscal tightening episode” if there are simultaneous decreases in the GDP shares 
of public wage bill and public deficit during at least one year. There are 129 fiscal tightening 
episodes over 305 country/year observations with public deficits available for the OECD countries 
over the period 1995-2009.  
The second definition is more restrictive: “long fiscal tightening episodes” occur if there are 
simultaneous increases in the GDP shares of public wage bill and public deficit during at least two 
years. Such fiscal tightening episodes occur for 96 country/year observations.  
3.2.  Description of fiscal drift episodes 
Table 2 displays the short fiscal drift episodes for every country. It turns out that short fiscal drift 
episodes occurred in almost all countries. There are only 2 exceptions: Korea and Norway, where 
net lending is always positive over the period. Most countries experienced more than one short 
fiscal drift episodes. The highest number of short fiscal drift episodes, equal to 6, is observed in 
Slovenia and in the United States, where all fiscal drift episodes appeared in the 2000s. Following 
countries are Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Slovak Republic where 5 short fiscal drift 
episodes are observed.  
Deficits are significantly higher during short fiscal drift episodes. On average, public net lending 
amounts to -4.5 percent of GDP during short fiscal drift episodes while it averages to -0.5 percent 
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of GDP excluding these episodes.7 Not surprisingly, the GDP share of public wage bill also 
increases much more during fiscal drift episodes (0.46 percentage point of GDP) than outside 
these episodes where this share actually decreases (-0.12 percentage point of GDP). 
Long fiscal drift episodes are observed more scarcely. Only 15 countries among the 32 OECD 
countries for which data are available experienced long fiscal drift episodes. On average, public 
deficits and changes in public wage bills are not statistically different during long and short fiscal 
drift episodes.  
3.3.  Description of fiscal tightening episodes 
Table 3 displays the short fiscal tightening episodes for every country. As for fiscal drift episodes 
there are no fiscal tightening episodes in Korea and Norway, because their net lending is never 
negative over the period. Most countries have several fiscal tightening episodes. Countries that 
reduce almost continuously their public wage bills over the period, like Austria, France, Germany 
and Israel have a relatively large number of fiscal tightening episodes, comprised between 6 and 8. 
But some other countries, which alternate periods of reductions and periods of increases in public 
wage bills, also have several fiscal tightening episodes. This is the case for Poland, Spain and the 
Netherlands, the UK and the US. At the opposite, Greece, Ireland and Portugal have no more than 
two short fiscal tightening episodes because their public wage bills increased over almost all the 
period.  
4. Determinants of fiscal drift and fiscal tightening episodes 
We are now looking at the determinants of fiscal drift and fiscal tightening episodes. We begin to 
describe how the interactions between business cycles, political cycles and some institutions may 
influence the occurrence of these episodes. Then, we present the econometric method and the 
empirical results.  
4.1. Cycles and institutions 
The impact of booms on the occurrence of fiscal drift and fiscal tightening episodes is a priori 
ambiguous. On the one hand, increases in GDP mechanically reduce the GDP shares of public 
wage bills and budget deficits. But on the other hand, as stressed by Alesina et al. (2008), in weakly 
transparent and strongly corrupt countries, GDP increases can intensify the fight over common 
resources, leading to larger budget deficits and larger public wage bills. Accordingly, the probability 
to observe fiscal drift (resp. tightening) episodes should be higher (resp. lower) during booms when 
                                                          
7 These figures are equal to -3.5 percent and -0.45 percent respectively if 2009 is excluded. 
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governments are more opaque and more corrupt. This probability should also be lower in 
presidential regimes, where there is overall less possibility of discretionary increases in public 
expenditure and less fragmentation of power than in parliamentary regimes. 
At first sight, fiscal drift episodes are more likely to come out during slumps, since reductions in 
the growth rate of GDP mechanically increase public deficits and the share of public wage bills in 
GDP. The opposite holds true for fiscal tightening episodes.  
The impact of slumps on fiscal drift and fiscal tightening episodes may depend on the quality of 
the government for two at least reasons. In the first place, in recessions, more transparent 
governments should have more incentives to adjust public wage bills in order to avoid soaring 
public deficits: when the actions of the government are transparent, voters are well informed about 
the use of public money, the effectiveness of spending and the long-term consequences of deficits. 
In the second place, more transparent governments should also be able to react more quickly: it is 
easier to cut spending when it is used in a transparent way than to cut rents that are distributed to 
secure future votes. Political institutions might also play a role as suggested by Persson and 
Tabellini (2000). For instance, countries with parliamentary regimes and proportional electoral 
systems tend to experience counter-cyclical changes in public spending and deficits, with a sort of 
ratchet effect (spending and deficits increase during slumps but do not decrease in the same 
proportion during booms). Unions in the public sector8, usually supported by other unions, could 
also influence the ability to adjust (Alesina, 1999). Because they often defend insiders first, unions 
are typically opposed to wage or hiring freeze, and even more so to public employment cuts in 
situations of negative GDP shock, thus delaying the adjustment. They would also tend to ask for 
more public employment or higher wages during booms, which would tend to foster fiscal drift.  
The occurrence of fiscal drift and fiscal tightening episodes can also be influenced by elections. 
During election years, candidates have incentives to increase public wage bills, possibly at the 
expense of worsening budget deficits. This type of behavior is likely to be amplified by corruption 
and lack of transparency (Shi and Svensson, 2006, Alesina et al. 2008). Elections cycles could also 
be institution-dependent. For instance, majoritarian countries should in theory experience larger 
election cycles because of the individual accountability of incumbents and incentives to spend more 
just before elections. One would expect countries with presidential regime to spend less than 
countries with parliamentary regimes during election years since checks and balances are stricter in 
                                                          
8
 Union coverage rates, i.e. the share of employees covered by collective wage agreements, can summarize the blocking 
power of unions better than union density. In some countries, such as France, union density can be very low (about 
8%), but union coverage quite high (about 90%) which gives unions a lot of influence in the political debates. 
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presidential regimes. Finally, in countries where unions are strong, election cycles could be even 
stronger with higher wages or hiring the years of elections.  
4.2. Econometric method 
In what follows, we evaluate to what extent the emergence of fiscal drift episodes is influenced by 
the features of public institutions, booms, slumps and elections. To answer this question, we 
estimate the following linear probability model9:   
                                                                                (1) 
where       is equal to 1 if there is a fiscal drift (or tightening) episode in country i at date t, and zero 
otherwise. What we call          for simplicity stands for a vector of events in country i at date t 
influencing the fiscal stance, which includes positive output gaps, negative output gaps and election 
years. The output gap is computed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter10. We distinguish two different 
variables for the output gap to the extent that positive and negative output gaps may have different 
effects on the occurrence of fiscal drift and fiscal tightening episodes. The variable “positive output 
gap” is equal to the output gap when it is positive and to zero otherwise. The variable “negative 
output gap” is defined similarly (in absolute terms).         stands for a vector of institutional 
characteristics of country i, w²hich includes the degree of transparency, the political regime 
(presidential versus parliamentary), the election rule (proportional versus majoritarian)11 and the 
union coverage rate12.       is a vector of control variables that comprises the share of the 
population over 65 and the share of population below 15.        is a dummy for the recession 
year 2009.     is a country fixed effect and      is a residual term.  
                                                          
9
 It is well known that the linear probability model for a binary dependent variable yields unbiased estimator but 
necessarily has a heteroskedastic error term. We deal with this problem by computing heteroskedasticity-robust 
statistics (see eg. Wooldridge, 2002). The estimation of dynamic panel data discrete choice non linear models with fixed 
effects and instrumental variables, which is still an area of research for econometricians, is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
10 With this specification we regress the outcome of a difference (the probability of drifts or tightening is the result of a 
changes in surpluses and public wage bills) on the output gap which is also a difference between the output and its 
long-term trend.  
11 We use the Quality of Government database (http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/) for the type of political regime and the 
election rule. 
12 We use the Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social 
Pacts, 1960-2010 (ICTWSS) from the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS), University of 
Amsterdam. Union coverage rates in the public sector are only available for a fourth of observations in our panel, while 
the general union coverage rates are available for the full panel.  We consider the latter. However, the two types of  
rates appear to be strongly correlated (the coefficient of correlation is 0.92), and the general union coverage rate (like 
the coverage rate in the private sector) strongly predicts the coverage rate in the public sector.   
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We consider different versions of equation (1) including alternative measures of the features of 
public institutions and definitions of the fiscal drift and fiscal tightening episodes. This equation 
raises several issues that call for specific treatments: 
 First, the presence of the lagged independent variable         is justified by the fact that 
fiscal stances are typically persistent over time. In this dynamic setting the OLS estimated 
are systematically biased (the residuals are auto-correlated) and do not converge unless we 
use a large number of time observations, which is not our case. Some techniques such as 
the Arellano-Bond method allow us to account for this autocorrelation issue. 
 Second, the           variable might be endogenous; in the case of the output gap, it is clear 
that the intensity of the shock on public finance can be reduced in the short-run by large 
deficits and higher public employment compensation spending. Thus, this variable needs to 
be instrumented with variables that are not influenced by the fiscal stance or by the change 
in public employment spending. We consider two different instruments for the output gap 
for country i at date t. First, the past values of output gaps of country i. Second, the 
contemporaneous output gaps of all countries except country i. 
 Third, the vector of institutional characteristics         is assumed to be constant over time. 
Actually, electoral rules and political systems do not change over time in most countries. 
The measures of transparency display some changes over time. However, transparency 
might be potentially endogenous; for instance if transparency is measured as the perception 
of corruption of public officers by voters, this perception might be influenced over time by 
the economic situation, which in turn can be influenced by the fiscal stance; also, acts of 
corruption might be more frequently observed at some times than others, such as general 
elections. For that reason, we interact the shock with the average value of the measure of 
transparency and other institutional variables over the period. This is also justified by the 
fact that there is little change over time in the measures the institutional variables over the 
relatively short period of time covered by our data.  
Our benchmark specification considers the first definition of fiscal drift episodes, which 
corresponds to years where there are simultaneously an increase in general government payroll and 
a decrease in public net lending in a situation of public deficit. The transparency of the government 
is measured with the corruption perception index of Transparency International, which takes on 
values from 0 to 10, a higher score corresponding to more transparent governments. In what 
follows, we use this variable centered on its average value over all the period 1995-2009 for all 
countries.  
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4.3.  Empirical results 
 
4.3.1. The impact of output gap and elections 
This section analyzes the relation between business and political cycles and fiscal episodes. We 
begin by neglecting the role of institutions by estimating equation (1) without interaction terms 
between cycles and institutions (i.e. assuming that coefficient a3  is equal to zero).  
Table 4 shows that the occurrence of short fiscal drift episodes is more likely when there are 
elections years and during economic booms. Strikingly, fiscal drift episodes are not more frequent 
when there are recessions, set aside the effect of the year 2009. This result shows up for different 
specifications of equation (1), which account for the autocorrelation of residuals and for the 
endogeneity of GDP shocks. Table 5 shows that the same result holds true for long fiscal drift 
episodes regarding positive output gaps, but not for elections. This clearly stems for the fact that 
general elections are rarely held two years in a row.  Table 6 shows that this pattern is specific to 
wage spending compared to non-wage spending. Indeed, when we analyze similar episodes of fiscal 
drift, but this time featuring a simultaneous increase of non-wage spending and deficits, fiscal drifts 
seem to be also associated with economic downturns, not only economic booms. This can be 
explained by the fact that most non-wage spending is made of transfers which are often counter-
cyclical (e.g. income replacement benefits).  
Tables 4 to 6 indicate that periods of simultaneous increases in public wage bills and in public 
budget deficits are not induced by adverse economic events. It seems that it is rather loose 
management of governments during economic booms as well as during periods of elections that 
fosters fiscal drifts.  
Tables 7 and 8 show that fiscal tightening episodes come out less often during booms than during 
slumps. The sign of the coefficient associated with election year is also negative, but not significant 
at 10 percent level of confidence. These results are consistent with those obtained for fiscal drift 
episodes. All in all, they show that fiscal problems are not resolved during booms. On the contrary, 
during booms, governments provide less effort to control public wage bills and public deficits.  
As shown by Figures 3 and 4, this phenomenon is well illustrated by Greece, where all fiscal drift 
episodes show up during booms (except in 2009, where the large drop in GDP induced a 
simultaneous increase in public deficit and in the share of public wage bill in GDP). There has been 
an increase in the public wage bill by 2.6 points of GDP (from 9.56 to 12.15 percent of GDP) 
between 1995 and 2008. Most of this increase (2 points) occurred during fiscal drift episodes 
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corresponding to periods of positive output gap. This clearly indicates that the unsustainable raise 
in the public wage bill occurred for the most part during booms in Greece, but not during slumps.  
4.3.2. The role of institutions 
The pro-cyclicality of fiscal drift episodes suggests that miss governance may influence the 
emergence of fiscal drift episodes. In order to shed some light on this issue, we estimate the impact 
of the transparency of the government and that of the freedom of the press on the occurrence of 
fiscal episodes, along with other institutional factors such as the political regime, the type of 
election rules and the power of unions.  
Transparency of government and other factors 
The analysis of cross country correlations shows that there is a negative relationship between the 
transparency of governments and the frequency of fiscal drift episodes, as shown by figure 5. 
Countries with transparent governments experienced less fiscal drift episodes than countries where 
the government was weakly transparent over the period 1995-2009. The gap is sizeable, equal to 30 
percentage points between the most and the least transparent countries. There is a similar relation 
between the frequency of fiscal drifts and freedom of the press, as shown by figure 6. Except for 
these two relations, cross country correlations do not allow us to exhibit any other significant 
relation between our measures of institutions and the emergence of fiscal drift or fiscal tightening 
episodes. However, within country correlations enable us to shed some light on the influence of 
institutions on the ability of governments to adjust public wage bills during business and political 
cycles. Formally, we estimate the coefficient associated with the interaction term between 
institutions and business and electoral cycles in equation (1).  
Table 9 presents the results when equation (1) is estimated using short fiscal drift episodes as 
dependent variable, and table 10 using long fiscal drift episodes, using the Transparency 
International index as a measure of transparency. Column 1 in both tables estimates this equation 
using country fixed effects. This column shows, again, that there is an overall positive and 
significant (at the 5 percent level) correlation between the contemporaneous positive output gap 
(for a country of average transparency)13 and the occurrence of fiscal drift episodes. The correlation 
with slumps is weaker. The relationship with booms is stronger for long episodes (at the 1 percent 
level). The occurrence of long fiscal drift episodes is not correlated with negative output gaps.  
                                                          
13 The institutional variables are centered on their means, so that the coefficients of the output gap hold for an 
“average” country in terms of institutional features. 
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The crossed effect between booms and transparency is negative and significant at the 5% level for 
short and long episodes only. This means that the emergence of fiscal drift episodes of at least 2 
years is less sensitive to booms in countries where governments are more transparent. In other 
words, more transparent governments are on average less prone to increase public deficits and 
public wage bills when the economy grows faster. In countries with the lowest degree of 
transparency, the relationship between booms and fiscal drift episodes becomes even positive.14 
The effect of transparency is sizeable due to large observed differences in this variable across 
countries: Mexico, which features the lowest average level of transparency, gets a low score of 3.4, 
whereas Denmark gets a top score equal to 9.3. This means that booms have a significant and 
negative impact on the probability of experiencing a fiscal drift in very transparent countries, while 
they have a significant positive impact of experiencing a fiscal drift in non-transparent countries. 
Interestingly, the impact of output gaps - negative or positive - is not influenced by the political 
regime or by election rules. However, fiscal drift episodes are more likely to occur during periods 
of negative output gap in countries where union coverage is higher. The resistance of strong trade 
unions to wage and employment compressions during recessions may explain this relationship.  
Election years are positively correlated with the occurrence of short fiscal drifts: the coefficient is 
large and significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, this relationship does not seem to prevail for 
presidential regimes: the crossed-effects between elections and the corresponding dummy is large, 
negative, and significant. This supports the intuition that the checks and balances typical of 
presidential regimes prevent fiscal drift in election years. There is no significant relationship with 
the type of election rule (majoritarian countries). Also, in more transparent countries, election years 
are less often associated with long and short fiscal drifts (but the size of the crossed effect is much 
smaller than that of the political regime) 
Column 2 in Tables 9 and 10 presents the results when equation (1) is estimated with the Arellano 
and Bond method to account for autocorrelation of residuals due to the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable. The results turn out to be close to those obtained with the fixed effect method 
for short episodes: the interaction term between the positive output gap and transparency is now 
significant at the 5 percent level (for short episodes this time), while the positive output gap alone 
still has a significant effect. The positive relation with elections and the negative crossed effect 
relation with presidential regimes and transparency are still significant, for short and long episodes. 
In column 3, we use the same method, but we take into account that the output gap might be 
endogenous (and so is instrumented by its lagged values and lagged differences accordingly). 
                                                          
14 For this country, the value of the transparency index is negative and the sign of the estimated coefficient of the 
crossed effect is also negative, while the sign of the estimated coefficient of the positive output gap variable is positive.  
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Results turn out to be similar. Column 4 shows the results using the same instruments as in the 
Arellano-Bond method for the lagged fiscal drift but where we instrument the output gap of each 
country using the average output gap of all other countries. The direct effect of output gaps does 
not come up. However, short fiscal drift episodes are still correlated with election years and their 
interaction with transparency and the type of political regime. Long fiscal drifts are still negatively 
correlated with the crossed effect of positive output gaps and transparency as well as with the 
interaction of elections and presidential regimes. All in all, Table 7 and 8 show that fiscal drift 
episodes are more likely to emerge during booms in countries where there is a parliamentary regime 
and where the transparency of the government is low.  
Tables 11 and 12 are devoted to short fiscal tightening and long fiscal tightening episodes 
respectively. We use the same empirical strategy as for the study of fiscal drift episodes. Overall, 
fiscal tightening episodes appear less frequently during booms. But the interaction terms between 
the output gap and the institutional variables such as the transparency of the government, the 
political regime and the electoral rule are not correlated with the emergence of fiscal tightening 
episodes. Election years appear to decrease the occurrence of fiscal tightening episodes. However, 
this effect is reversed in countries with presidential regime, where election years are more often 
associated with fiscal tightening episodes. This result is consistent with those of Brender and 
Drazen (2008) who find that leaders who reduce the deficit during an election year, relative to the 
previous year, have a higher probability of being reelected.  
Freedom of the press  
The analysis of cross country correlations shows that there is a negative relationship between the 
freedom of the press and the frequency of fiscal drift episodes, as shown by figure 6. As for 
transparency, countries with strong freedom of the press experienced less fiscal drift episodes than 
countries where the freedom of the press was weak over the period 1995-2009.  
In tables 13 to 16, we estimate equation (1) where transparency is proxied by the freedom of press 
(from Freedom House15) instead of perceptions of the exercise of public power for private gain (i.e. 
the typical definition used to build corruption indexes). Here, like for the two previous measures, a 
higher index means higher transparency so the results can be interpreted in the same way. Tables 
13 and 14 show that the probability that a fiscal drift episode occurs is lower in countries with 
stronger freedom of the press. In particular, fiscal drift episodes are less frequent during booms 
and election years in countries where there is more freedom of the press. Tables 15 and 16, show 
                                                          
15 Freedom House is a non-governmental organization that supports the expansion of freedom around the world, 
notably the freedom of press. http://www.freedomhouse.org 
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that fiscal tightening episodes are not correlated with the interaction terms between the freedom of 
press and the output gap or the election years, as it is the case with the other measures of 
transparency. 
4.3.3. Robustness 
Transparency 
Our results about the relation between the occurrence of fiscal episodes and transparency of 
governments may rely on a specific measure of transparency. In order to deal with this issue, we 
use an alternative measure of transparency. Table 17 for long fiscal drift episodes16 (and 18 for long 
fiscal tightening episodes) is similar to table 10 (respectively 12) except that it uses the World Bank 
measure of corruption instead of that of Transparency International.17 Again, the crossed effect 
between the output gap and corruption is significantly positive for long fiscal drift episodes (but 
still not significant for fiscal tight episodes) and even larger in size than with the previous measure 
with all methods of estimation. Positive output gap alone is still, on average, positively correlated 
with the occurrence of fiscal drift, and negatively correlated with the occurrence of fiscal 
tightening. The correlations with election years crossed with the type of political regime and with 
transparency remain unchanged. 
Political cycle 
The variable “election year” accounts for the impact of elections on fiscal episodes in a very crude 
way. For instance, when an election is held in the first quarter of a given year it might be more 
relevant to focus on the year just before the election rather than on the year of the election. 
Moreover, an index for pre-election years and another for post-election years could help better 
identify the presence of budget cycles. We tested these alternative definitions and none changed 
significantly the overall impact previously identified of elections on fiscal drifts and the absence of 
fiscal drift in presidential regimes the year or elections or the year just before (tables are available 
upon request). 
                                                          
16
 In this section we show results for long episodes only for the sake of simplicity. However, results are comparable 
using short episodes instead. 
17 The World Bank measure of corruption, as well as the Freedom of press index used below, are not available for 2009 
(the last available year in our dataset) but these indexes are very stable over time and we have considered that their 
average values over 1995-2008 apply to 2009 as well in order to have comparable results with the main tables that use 
the Transparency International index (tables 6 and 7). The exclusion of the year 2009 in the regressions in tables 6 and 
7 slightly reinforces the correlation of short fiscal drifts with positive output gaps, but has only a marginal impact on 
the relationship with long fiscal drifts (which are mechanically less often observed at the end of the considered period). 
The exclusion of the same year from the regressions in tables 8 to 11 has a very small impact on the results overall. 
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Business cycle 
Our finding that fiscal drift episodes occur more frequently during booms than during recessions 
might be driven by our measure of booms and slumps, which are merely defined as periods of 
either positive or negative output gap. To show that this is not the case, we define booms and 
slumps in a more restrictive way. Tables 19 to 22 reproduce tables 5, 8, 10 and 12 but considering 
this time output gap variations of at least 1% in absolute value (which make up approximately one 
third of all observed changes in output gaps). Table 19 (respectively 20) shows that the results are 
very stable: long fiscal drift episodes (respectively long fiscal tightening episodes) are still positively 
(respectively negatively) and significantly correlated with positive output gaps (and not negative 
ones). Table 21 (respectively 22) shows that the crossed-effect of transparency with positive output 
gaps on the occurrence of fiscal drift episodes (respectively tightening episodes) is still negative and 
significant (respectively not significant), even when the economy experiences large shocks. Results 
regarding elections years and crossed-effects with the type of regime, transparency or union 
coverage are broadly unchanged.  
Panel composition 
Finally, we check that our results are not driven by outliers by removing countries one by one from 
the panel to check to what extent results could rely solely on one country. Tables 23 and  24 
present the estimated coefficients as in Table 10 and 12, column 3, i.e. correlations of long episodes 
of fiscal drifts and fiscal tightening with shocks and institutions, using the transparency 
international index and the Arellano-Bond method with endogenous output gaps. Results turn out 
very stable. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
This paper shows that there is a strong relation between worsening public finances and increases in 
public wage bills. However, this relation does not mean that large public wage bills are 
systematically conducive to worsening public finances. Actually, countries with the highest GDP 
shares of public wage bill also have the highest public net lending.  This means that large public 
sectors have been compatible with sustainable public budgets in the OECD countries over the last 
15 years. Our paper clearly shows that countries unable to adjust their public wage bills to make 
them compatible with sustainable public budgets are not those which are especially hit by negative 
economic shocks. Their main handicap is a lack of transparency and a lack of checks and balances 
18 
 
on the political power of elected politicians. And in these countries, in the absence of institutional 
reform, the fiscal stance might deteriorate even further in upcoming economic booms because of 
public employment. 
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Figures 
Figure 1 : Average public wage bill and net lending in OECD countries over the period 
1995-2009. Source: OECD 
 
Source: OECD data 
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Figure 2: Public wage bills in OECD countries over the period 1995-2009.  
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Source: OECD data 
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Figure 3: Fiscal drift episodes and output gap in Greece over the period 1995-2009 
 
 
Source: OECD data 
 
Figure 4: Fiscal tightening episodes and output gap in Greece over the period 1995-2009.  
 
 
 
Source: OECD data 
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Figure 5: Frequency of fiscal drift episodes and transparency of governments over the 
period 1995-2009.  
 
Source: OECD and Transparency international data 
 
Figure 6: Frequency of fiscal drift episodes and freedom of the press over the period 1995-
2009.  
 
Source: OECD and Freedom house data 
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Tables 
 
 
 
Table 1: Within country correlation between public net lending and public wage bill 
  
                           Net lending      Net lending     Net lending     
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Public wage bill     -1.581***       -1.598**         -1.494**  
                    (0.546)          (0.589)          (0.655)    
GDP growth                           -0.053            0.057    
                                     (0.222)          (0.278)    
Pop over 65                                            0.398 
                                                      (0.320)    
 
Pop below 15                                           0.041    
                                                      (0.237)    
Constant            28.731***        29.117***        12.106    
                    (9.549)         (10.486)          (9.973)    
Country effects        Yes              Yes              Yes    
(5-year avg.) 
R²                    0.900           0.900             0.907    
Adj. R²               0.846           0.843             0.848    
Obs.                     84              84                84    
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
OLS with country fixed effects. Period 1995-2009. Variables are averaged over five year periods: 1995-1999, 2000-
2004, 2005-2009. 
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Table 2: Fiscal drift episodes. There is a fiscal drift episode if there are simultaneous increases in the 
GPD shares of public budget deficits and public wage bills. 
 
Note : “na” for not available. Source: OECD data. 
 
Table 3: Fiscal tightening episodes. There is a fiscal drift episode if there are simultaneous decreases in 
the GPD shares of public budget deficits and public wage bills. 
 
Note : “na” for not available. Source: OECD data. 
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Table 4: Correlation between short fiscal drifts and shocks 
 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Fiscal Drift                         0.099           0.112*          0.080          -0.067    
                                          (0.060)         (0.060)         (0.053)         (0.292)    
Neg Output gap                              0.029           0.031           0.034*          0.093    
                                          (0.019)         (0.020)         (0.018)         (0.061)    
Pos Output gap                              0.031*          0.038**         0.034**         0.070*   
                                          (0.015)         (0.016)         (0.015)         (0.041)    
Election                                    0.103**         0.087**         0.097**         0.117*** 
                                          (0.046)         (0.041)         (0.042)         (0.042)    
Pop below 15                               -0.039          -0.048          -0.044          -0.022    
                                          (0.032)         (0.036)         (0.031)         (0.038)    
Pop over 65                                -0.045          -0.053          -0.054          -0.054    
                                          (0.043)         (0.049)         (0.047)         (0.038)    
d 2009                                      0.540***        0.529***        0.527***        0.479*** 
                                          (0.095)         (0.100)         (0.091)         (0.143)    
Constant                                    1.451           1.733           1.673           1.208    
                                          (1.150)         (1.293)         (1.177)         (1.153)    
R²                                          0.172                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.157                                                    
Obs.                                          387             375             375             362    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Correlation between long fiscal drifts and shocks 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Long Fiscal Drift                    0.591***        0.556***        0.559***        0.297*** 
                                          (0.032)         (0.042)         (0.040)         (0.111)    
Neg Output gap                             -0.004          -0.001          -0.005           0.043    
                                          (0.008)         (0.012)         (0.009)         (0.038)    
Pos Output gap                              0.037***        0.029**         0.032**         0.103*** 
                                          (0.013)         (0.015)         (0.012)         (0.030)    
Election                                    0.003           0.010           0.004           0.020    
                                          (0.034)         (0.036)         (0.033)         (0.031)    
Pop below 15                               -0.031          -0.070***       -0.031          -0.010    
                                          (0.019)         (0.021)         (0.022)         (0.026)    
Pop over 65                                -0.023          -0.058***       -0.030          -0.044*   
                                          (0.021)         (0.016)         (0.023)         (0.026)    
d 2009                                      0.126***        0.007           0.108***        0.192*   
                                          (0.040)         (0.054)         (0.039)         (0.104)    
Constant                                    0.927           2.148***        1.038           0.788    
                                          (0.618)         (0.582)         (0.691)         (0.760)    
R²                                          0.350                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.338                                                    
Obs.                                          387             375             375             362    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i. 
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Table 6:  Correlation between short fiscal drifts (using non wage spending) and shocks 
 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Fiscal Drift (non-wage)              0.049           0.036           0.036           0.395    
                                          (0.059)         (0.058)         (0.051)         (0.288)    
Neg Output gap                              0.046**         0.044**         0.051**         0.129*   
                                          (0.021)         (0.020)         (0.020)         (0.070)    
Pos Output gap                              0.034*          0.037**         0.037**         0.153*** 
                                          (0.018)         (0.019)         (0.018)         (0.045)    
Election                                    0.100*          0.092*          0.088*          0.111**  
                                          (0.055)         (0.049)         (0.051)         (0.047)    
Pop below 15                               -0.037          -0.062**        -0.037           0.016    
                                          (0.027)         (0.030)         (0.026)         (0.040)    
Pop over 65                                -0.044          -0.071*         -0.042          -0.038    
                                          (0.039)         (0.041)         (0.042)         (0.040)    
d 2009                                      0.526***        0.566***        0.526***        0.355**  
                                          (0.105)         (0.102)         (0.101)         (0.157)    
Constant                                    1.423           2.283**         1.402           0.162    
                                          (0.998)         (1.100)         (1.035)         (1.183)    
R²                                          0.154                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.139                                                    
Obs.                                          384             373             373             361    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i. 
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Table 7: Correlation between short fiscal tightenings and shocks 
 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Fiscal Tight                         0.203***        0.213***        0.211***        0.074    
                                          (0.045)         (0.046)         (0.045)         (0.201)    
Neg Output gap                             -0.007          -0.001          -0.007          -0.083    
                                          (0.019)         (0.022)         (0.020)         (0.057)    
Pos Output gap                             -0.051***       -0.050***       -0.051***       -0.118*** 
                                          (0.018)         (0.018)         (0.018)         (0.043)    
Election                                   -0.062          -0.063          -0.054          -0.070    
                                          (0.043)         (0.040)         (0.039)         (0.045)    
Pop below 15                                0.023           0.063           0.037          -0.003    
                                          (0.024)         (0.041)         (0.030)         (0.038)    
Pop over 65                                 0.022           0.033           0.024           0.023    
                                          (0.018)         (0.030)         (0.024)         (0.038)    
d 2009                                     -0.271***       -0.291***       -0.266***       -0.206    
                                          (0.071)         (0.075)         (0.069)         (0.149)    
Constant                                   -0.430          -1.333          -0.719           0.166    
                                          (0.638)         (1.119)         (0.834)         (1.100)    
R²                                          0.102                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.086                                                    
Obs.                                          387             375             375             362    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Correlation between long fiscal tightenings and shocks 
 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Long Fiscal Tight                    0.461***        0.491***        0.481***        0.191**  
                                          (0.038)         (0.032)         (0.033)         (0.092)    
Neg Output gap                             -0.004          -0.005          -0.006          -0.077    
                                          (0.014)         (0.018)         (0.014)         (0.047)    
Pos Output gap                             -0.043***       -0.052***       -0.045***       -0.101*** 
                                          (0.014)         (0.018)         (0.013)         (0.037)    
Election                                   -0.009          -0.009          -0.002          -0.022    
                                          (0.033)         (0.029)         (0.030)         (0.038)    
Pop below 15                                0.020           0.042           0.019           0.009    
                                          (0.020)         (0.032)         (0.018)         (0.032)    
Pop over 65                                 0.005           0.014           0.006           0.019    
                                          (0.016)         (0.022)         (0.016)         (0.032)    
d 2009                                     -0.160**        -0.167**        -0.160***       -0.109    
                                          (0.061)         (0.077)         (0.059)         (0.126)    
Constant                                   -0.272          -0.812          -0.277          -0.112    
                                          (0.545)         (0.832)         (0.512)         (0.921)    
R²                                          0.276                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.262                                                    
Obs.                                          387             375             375             362    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i. 
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Table 9: Correlation between short fiscal drifts and shocks interacted with institutions (using the 
Transparency International index for transparency) 
 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Fiscal Drift                         0.092           0.107           0.092           0.022    
                                          (0.072)         (0.071)         (0.069)         (0.163)    
Neg Output gap                              0.029           0.024           0.028           0.080    
                                          (0.019)         (0.019)         (0.018)         (0.065)    
Pos Output gap                              0.032**         0.033**         0.031**         0.106*   
                                          (0.015)         (0.015)         (0.014)         (0.064)    
Neg Output gap * Transparency              -0.007          -0.009          -0.007          -0.032    
                                          (0.011)         (0.012)         (0.011)         (0.024)    
Pos Output gap * Transparency              -0.022**        -0.027***       -0.022**        -0.029    
                                          (0.010)         (0.010)         (0.009)         (0.023)    
Neg Output gap * Presidential               0.004           0.008           0.005           0.133    
                                          (0.076)         (0.076)         (0.072)         (0.276)    
Pos Output gap * Presidential               0.035           0.026           0.036           0.333    
                                          (0.077)         (0.087)         (0.074)         (0.300)    
Neg Output gap * Majoritarian               0.161**         0.144**         0.162**         0.321**  
                                          (0.069)         (0.069)         (0.067)         (0.147)    
Pos Output gap * Majoritarian               0.068           0.061           0.069           0.197    
                                          (0.059)         (0.060)         (0.057)         (0.139)    
Neg Output gap * Union Coverage             0.003***        0.003***        0.003***        0.004**  
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Pos Output gap * Union Coverage             0.002*          0.002*          0.002**         0.001    
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Election                                    0.136***        0.127***        0.135***        0.145*** 
                                          (0.040)         (0.038)         (0.038)         (0.054)    
Election * Presidential                    -0.277**        -0.256**        -0.277***       -0.398**  
                                          (0.105)         (0.105)         (0.101)         (0.171)    
Election * Transparency                    -0.058***       -0.059***       -0.058***       -0.075**  
                                          (0.019)         (0.019)         (0.019)         (0.030)    
Election * Majoritarian                    -0.067          -0.058          -0.066          -0.130    
                                          (0.088)         (0.082)         (0.084)         (0.128)    
Election * Union Coverage                   0.001           0.001           0.001          -0.000    
                                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.003)    
Pop below 15                               -0.058          -0.064          -0.059*         -0.034    
                                          (0.037)         (0.042)         (0.036)         (0.050)    
Pop over 65                                -0.065          -0.079**        -0.066*         -0.016    
                                          (0.040)         (0.035)         (0.038)         (0.050)    
d 2009                                      0.542***        0.543***        0.543***        0.519*** 
                                          (0.098)         (0.099)         (0.094)         (0.150)    
Constant                                    2.077*          2.366**         2.087*          0.850    
                                          (1.176)         (1.187)         (1.126)         (1.409)    
R²                                          0.241                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.201                                                    
Obs.                                          382             353             353             325    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i. 
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Table 10: Correlation between long fiscal drifts and shocks interacted with institutions (using the 
Transparency International index for transparency) 
 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Long Fiscal Drift                    0.598***        0.568***        0.598***        0.316**  
                                          (0.038)         (0.038)         (0.037)         (0.124)    
Neg Output gap                             -0.001          -0.005          -0.002           0.006    
                                          (0.010)         (0.012)         (0.009)         (0.051)    
Pos Output gap                              0.038***        0.033**         0.038***        0.084*   
                                          (0.013)         (0.014)         (0.012)         (0.050)    
Neg Output gap * Transparency              -0.007           0.005          -0.007          -0.032*   
                                          (0.006)         (0.007)         (0.006)         (0.019)    
Pos Output gap * Transparency              -0.021**        -0.011          -0.021***       -0.038**  
                                          (0.008)         (0.009)         (0.007)         (0.018)    
Neg Output gap * Presidential               0.012           0.081*          0.012           0.144    
                                          (0.038)         (0.043)         (0.037)         (0.220)    
Pos Output gap * Presidential               0.061           0.155**         0.061           0.298    
                                          (0.072)         (0.072)         (0.069)         (0.241)    
Neg Output gap * Majoritarian               0.037           0.039           0.037           0.238**  
                                          (0.028)         (0.029)         (0.027)         (0.116)    
Pos Output gap * Majoritarian               0.017           0.029           0.017           0.143    
                                          (0.036)         (0.039)         (0.034)         (0.109)    
Neg Output gap * Union Coverage             0.000           0.001           0.000           0.002    
                                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.002)    
Pos Output gap * Union Coverage             0.001*          0.001*          0.001*          0.001    
                                          (0.000)         (0.001)         (0.000)         (0.002)    
Election                                    0.008           0.010           0.008           0.013    
                                          (0.021)         (0.023)         (0.020)         (0.042)    
Election * Presidential                    -0.209***       -0.202***       -0.208***       -0.252*   
                                          (0.053)         (0.054)         (0.051)         (0.135)    
Election * Transparency                    -0.025***       -0.023***       -0.025***       -0.029    
                                          (0.009)         (0.008)         (0.008)         (0.024)    
Election * Majoritarian                     0.092**         0.080*          0.093***        0.053    
                                          (0.035)         (0.042)         (0.033)         (0.100)    
Election * Union Coverage                   0.002***        0.002**         0.002***        0.002    
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Pop below 15                               -0.039*         -0.069***       -0.039**        -0.034    
                                          (0.020)         (0.018)         (0.019)         (0.038)    
Pop over 65                                -0.023          -0.045***       -0.023           0.004    
                                          (0.018)         (0.016)         (0.017)         (0.039)    
d 2009                                      0.118***        0.026           0.118***        0.268**  
                                          (0.041)         (0.050)         (0.040)         (0.120)    
Constant                                    1.071*          1.945***        1.074**         0.550    
                                          (0.563)         (0.484)         (0.543)         (1.075)    
R²                                          0.400                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.369                                                    
Obs.                                          382             353             353             325    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i. 
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Table 11: Correlation between short fiscal tightenings and shocks interacted with institutions (using the 
Transparency International index for transparency) 
 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Fiscal Tight                         0.193***        0.189***        0.192***       -0.291    
                                          (0.051)         (0.051)         (0.049)         (0.215)    
Neg Output gap                             -0.005          -0.003          -0.005          -0.125    
                                          (0.017)         (0.020)         (0.016)         (0.079)    
Pos Output gap                             -0.051***       -0.052***       -0.052***       -0.155**  
                                          (0.018)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.076)    
Neg Output gap * Transparency               0.000           0.000           0.000          -0.003    
                                          (0.011)         (0.012)         (0.011)         (0.030)    
Pos Output gap * Transparency              -0.011          -0.010          -0.011          -0.039    
                                          (0.011)         (0.010)         (0.010)         (0.030)    
Neg Output gap * Presidential              -0.038          -0.043          -0.037          -0.170    
                                          (0.057)         (0.057)         (0.054)         (0.335)    
Pos Output gap * Presidential              -0.069          -0.089          -0.068          -0.345    
                                          (0.072)         (0.072)         (0.069)         (0.361)    
Neg Output gap * Majoritarian              -0.083***       -0.060*         -0.082***       -0.311*   
                                          (0.029)         (0.034)         (0.028)         (0.168)    
Pos Output gap * Majoritarian              -0.062          -0.031          -0.061          -0.333**  
                                          (0.050)         (0.053)         (0.047)         (0.169)    
Neg Output gap * Union Coverage            -0.002***       -0.002**        -0.002***       -0.004    
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.003)    
Pos Output gap * Union Coverage            -0.001          -0.001          -0.001          -0.002    
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.003)    
Election                                   -0.056          -0.063*         -0.056          -0.043    
                                          (0.038)         (0.036)         (0.037)         (0.065)    
Election * Presidential                     0.144           0.147           0.145           0.173    
                                          (0.102)         (0.091)         (0.098)         (0.205)    
Election * Transparency                     0.034           0.027           0.033           0.003    
                                          (0.022)         (0.022)         (0.021)         (0.036)    
Election * Majoritarian                    -0.099          -0.084          -0.098          -0.030    
                                          (0.108)         (0.099)         (0.103)         (0.154)    
Election * Union Coverage                  -0.004*         -0.004*         -0.004*         -0.002    
                                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.003)    
Pop below 15                                0.023           0.034           0.022           0.010    
                                          (0.032)         (0.038)         (0.030)         (0.057)    
Pop over 65                                 0.029           0.013           0.029           0.008    
                                          (0.021)         (0.027)         (0.020)         (0.061)    
d 2009                                     -0.274***       -0.284***       -0.273***       -0.216    
                                          (0.074)         (0.074)         (0.071)         (0.182)    
Constant                                   -0.529          -0.497          -0.520           0.342    
                                          (0.812)         (1.012)         (0.780)         (1.637)    
R²                                          0.144                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.099                                                    
Obs.                                          382             353             353             325    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i. 
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Table 12: Correlation between long fiscal tightening episodes and shocks interacted with institutions 
(using the Transparency International index for transparency) 
 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Long Fiscal Tight                    0.460***        0.475***        0.460***       -0.035    
                                          (0.040)         (0.043)         (0.038)         (0.154)    
Neg Output gap                             -0.000          -0.006          -0.000          -0.056    
                                          (0.014)         (0.019)         (0.014)         (0.065)    
Pos Output gap                             -0.043***       -0.062***       -0.043***       -0.085    
                                          (0.012)         (0.019)         (0.012)         (0.062)    
Neg Output gap * Transparency               0.012           0.017*          0.012           0.005    
                                          (0.009)         (0.009)         (0.009)         (0.023)    
Pos Output gap * Transparency               0.002           0.008           0.002          -0.012    
                                          (0.007)         (0.008)         (0.007)         (0.022)    
Neg Output gap * Presidential              -0.036          -0.064          -0.036          -0.150    
                                          (0.057)         (0.064)         (0.054)         (0.262)    
Pos Output gap * Presidential              -0.072          -0.135          -0.072          -0.230    
                                          (0.066)         (0.085)         (0.063)         (0.286)    
Neg Output gap * Majoritarian               0.001           0.015           0.001          -0.172    
                                          (0.037)         (0.046)         (0.036)         (0.137)    
Pos Output gap * Majoritarian              -0.057***       -0.018          -0.057***       -0.295**  
                                          (0.018)         (0.029)         (0.017)         (0.146)    
Neg Output gap * Union Coverage            -0.001          -0.001          -0.001          -0.004*   
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Pos Output gap * Union Coverage            -0.001**        -0.001*         -0.001***       -0.004*   
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Election                                   -0.006          -0.011          -0.006           0.037    
                                          (0.026)         (0.023)         (0.025)         (0.051)    
Election * Presidential                     0.134*          0.166***        0.134**         0.034    
                                          (0.066)         (0.054)         (0.063)         (0.163)    
Election * Transparency                     0.019           0.024*          0.019          -0.015    
                                          (0.015)         (0.014)         (0.014)         (0.029)    
Election * Majoritarian                    -0.058          -0.037          -0.058           0.015    
                                          (0.070)         (0.059)         (0.067)         (0.121)    
Election * Union Coverage                  -0.003*         -0.002*         -0.003**        -0.002    
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Pop below 15                                0.032           0.038           0.032           0.040    
                                          (0.022)         (0.032)         (0.022)         (0.046)    
Pop over 65                                 0.016           0.019           0.016           0.025    
                                          (0.017)         (0.016)         (0.016)         (0.049)    
d 2009                                     -0.152**        -0.195***       -0.152***       -0.145    
                                          (0.057)         (0.075)         (0.055)         (0.142)    
Constant                                   -0.640          -0.769          -0.639          -0.719    
                                          (0.609)         (0.768)         (0.590)         (1.311)    
R²                                          0.307                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.271                                                    
Obs.                                          382             353             353             325    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i. 
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Table 13: Correlation between short fiscal drifts and shocks interacted with institutions (using the 
Freedom of Press index as a proxy for transparency) 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Fiscal Drift                         0.092           0.103           0.092           0.051    
                                          (0.071)         (0.070)         (0.068)         (0.171)    
Neg Output gap                              0.027           0.021           0.026           0.071    
                                          (0.019)         (0.020)         (0.018)         (0.061)    
Pos Output gap                              0.033**         0.033**         0.032**         0.096    
                                          (0.015)         (0.016)         (0.015)         (0.061)    
Neg Output gap * Press                     -0.008*         -0.006          -0.008*         -0.020*   
                                          (0.005)         (0.006)         (0.004)         (0.012)    
Pos Output gap * Press                     -0.006**        -0.005*         -0.006**        -0.011*   
                                          (0.003)         (0.003)         (0.003)         (0.006)    
Neg Output gap * Presidential               0.007           0.026           0.008           0.051    
                                          (0.074)         (0.072)         (0.071)         (0.264)    
Pos Output gap * Presidential               0.035           0.032           0.035           0.237    
                                          (0.076)         (0.083)         (0.073)         (0.281)    
Neg Output gap * Majoritarian               0.150**         0.141**         0.151**         0.275*   
                                          (0.064)         (0.064)         (0.062)         (0.144)    
Pos Output gap * Majoritarian               0.042           0.037           0.043           0.156    
                                          (0.057)         (0.058)         (0.055)         (0.132)    
Neg Output gap * Union Coverage             0.003***        0.003***        0.003***        0.004**  
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Pos Output gap * Union Coverage             0.002*          0.002           0.002**         0.001    
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Election                                    0.136***        0.125***        0.136***        0.149*** 
                                          (0.041)         (0.040)         (0.040)         (0.053)    
Election * Presidential                    -0.225**        -0.195**        -0.224**        -0.312*   
                                          (0.096)         (0.094)         (0.092)         (0.160)    
Election * Press                           -0.011*         -0.011**        -0.011**        -0.019**  
                                          (0.006)         (0.005)         (0.006)         (0.008)    
Election * Majoritarian                    -0.138          -0.122          -0.137          -0.241**  
                                          (0.092)         (0.087)         (0.088)         (0.121)    
Election * Union Coverage                   0.000           0.001           0.000          -0.001    
                                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)    
Pop below 15                               -0.053          -0.057          -0.053          -0.033    
                                          (0.037)         (0.043)         (0.035)         (0.049)    
Pop over 65                                -0.064          -0.074**        -0.064*         -0.023    
                                          (0.040)         (0.037)         (0.038)         (0.049)    
d 2009                                      0.546***        0.555***        0.547***        0.507*** 
                                          (0.101)         (0.100)         (0.097)         (0.146)    
Constant                                    1.959           2.189*          1.969*          0.948    
                                          (1.169)         (1.230)         (1.121)         (1.378)    
R²                                          0.237                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.197                                                    
Obs.                                          382             353             353             325    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i. 
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Table 14: Correlation between long fiscal drifts and shocks interacted with institutions (using Freedom 
of Press index as a proxy for transparency) 
 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Long Fiscal Drift                    0.596***        0.572***        0.596***        0.346*** 
                                          (0.037)         (0.037)         (0.036)         (0.121)    
Neg Output gap                             -0.002          -0.007          -0.002          -0.021    
                                          (0.010)         (0.012)         (0.010)         (0.048)    
Pos Output gap                              0.039***        0.032**         0.039***        0.060    
                                          (0.013)         (0.015)         (0.013)         (0.046)    
Neg Output gap * Press                     -0.007**         0.001          -0.007***       -0.026*** 
                                          (0.003)         (0.003)         (0.003)         (0.009)    
Pos Output gap * Press                     -0.005**        -0.001          -0.005***       -0.014*** 
                                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.005)    
Neg Output gap * Presidential               0.011           0.082**         0.011           0.076    
                                          (0.038)         (0.042)         (0.036)         (0.209)    
Pos Output gap * Presidential               0.061           0.158**         0.061           0.219    
                                          (0.076)         (0.073)         (0.073)         (0.222)    
Neg Output gap * Majoritarian               0.026           0.051           0.027           0.182    
                                          (0.029)         (0.032)         (0.028)         (0.112)    
Pos Output gap * Majoritarian              -0.007           0.027          -0.007           0.083    
                                          (0.041)         (0.043)         (0.039)         (0.103)    
Neg Output gap * Union Coverage             0.000           0.001*          0.000           0.002    
                                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.002)    
Pos Output gap * Union Coverage             0.001           0.001           0.001           0.001    
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.000)         (0.001)    
Election                                    0.007           0.009           0.007           0.006    
                                          (0.022)         (0.023)         (0.021)         (0.042)    
Election * Presidential                    -0.181***       -0.184***       -0.181***       -0.198    
                                          (0.059)         (0.058)         (0.056)         (0.127)    
Election * Press                           -0.005**        -0.005***       -0.005***       -0.008    
                                          (0.002)         (0.001)         (0.002)         (0.006)    
Election * Majoritarian                     0.068           0.058           0.068           0.018    
                                          (0.044)         (0.045)         (0.042)         (0.095)    
Election * Union Coverage                   0.002***        0.002**         0.002***        0.002    
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Pop below 15                               -0.035*         -0.068***       -0.035*         -0.040    
                                          (0.020)         (0.017)         (0.019)         (0.038)    
Pop over 65                                -0.022          -0.045***       -0.022          -0.004    
                                          (0.017)         (0.016)         (0.017)         (0.038)    
d 2009                                      0.119***        0.027           0.119***        0.286**  
                                          (0.040)         (0.053)         (0.039)         (0.119)    
Constant                                    0.979*          1.916***        0.981*          0.821    
                                          (0.551)         (0.458)         (0.531)         (1.052)    
R²                                          0.396                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.365                                                    
Obs.                                          382             353             353             325    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i. 
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Table 15: Correlation between short fiscal tightenings and shocks interacted with institutions (using the 
Freedom of Press index as a proxy for transparency) 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Fiscal Tight                         0.195***        0.188***        0.195***       -0.174    
                                          (0.051)         (0.051)         (0.049)         (0.189)    
Neg Output gap                             -0.003          -0.002          -0.004          -0.095    
                                          (0.018)         (0.021)         (0.017)         (0.070)    
Pos Output gap                             -0.050***       -0.051***       -0.051***       -0.130**  
                                          (0.018)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.065)    
Neg Output gap * Press                     -0.005          -0.007          -0.005          -0.012    
                                          (0.005)         (0.004)         (0.005)         (0.014)    
Pos Output gap * Press                     -0.003          -0.004          -0.003          -0.009    
                                          (0.003)         (0.002)         (0.003)         (0.007)    
Neg Output gap * Presidential              -0.054          -0.064          -0.053          -0.018    
                                          (0.054)         (0.053)         (0.051)         (0.301)    
Pos Output gap * Presidential              -0.078          -0.099          -0.077          -0.168    
                                          (0.072)         (0.068)         (0.068)         (0.318)    
Neg Output gap * Majoritarian              -0.088**        -0.068          -0.087**        -0.327**  
                                          (0.037)         (0.043)         (0.035)         (0.158)    
Pos Output gap * Majoritarian              -0.082*         -0.053          -0.082**        -0.397**  
                                          (0.043)         (0.048)         (0.041)         (0.157)    
Neg Output gap * Union Coverage            -0.002**        -0.001          -0.002***       -0.003    
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Pos Output gap * Union Coverage            -0.002*         -0.001          -0.002*         -0.003    
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Election                                   -0.057          -0.064*         -0.058          -0.045    
                                          (0.039)         (0.037)         (0.037)         (0.061)    
Election * Presidential                     0.119           0.125           0.120           0.152    
                                          (0.097)         (0.089)         (0.093)         (0.181)    
Election * Press                            0.005           0.004           0.005          -0.004    
                                          (0.004)         (0.003)         (0.003)         (0.009)    
Election * Majoritarian                    -0.049          -0.047          -0.048           0.003    
                                          (0.095)         (0.089)         (0.091)         (0.139)    
Election * Union Coverage                  -0.003*         -0.003*         -0.003*         -0.002    
                                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.003)    
Pop below 15                                0.024           0.036           0.023           0.003    
                                          (0.032)         (0.039)         (0.031)         (0.054)    
Pop over 65                                 0.028           0.011           0.028           0.013    
                                          (0.021)         (0.028)         (0.020)         (0.057)    
d 2009                                     -0.275***       -0.285***       -0.274***       -0.229    
                                          (0.076)         (0.076)         (0.072)         (0.169)    
Constant                                    -0.533          -0.490          -0.524           0.320    
                                          (0.830)         (1.037)         (0.797)         (1.520)    
R²                                          0.142                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.096                                                    
Obs.                                          382             353             353             325    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i. 
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Table 16: Correlation between long fiscal tightenings and shocks interacted with institutions (using the 
Freedom of Press index as a proxy for transparency) 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Long Fiscal Tight                    0.457***        0.473***        0.457***        0.192*   
                                          (0.040)         (0.044)         (0.038)         (0.115)    
Neg Output gap                             -0.001          -0.007          -0.001          -0.005    
                                          (0.015)         (0.020)         (0.014)         (0.054)    
Pos Output gap                             -0.042***       -0.062***       -0.043***       -0.047    
                                          (0.012)         (0.019)         (0.012)         (0.050)    
Neg Output gap * Press                      0.001           0.003           0.001          -0.004    
                                          (0.004)         (0.004)         (0.004)         (0.010)    
Pos Output gap * Press                     -0.001           0.000          -0.001          -0.005    
                                          (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.006)    
Neg Output gap * Presidential              -0.045          -0.078          -0.045          -0.028    
                                          (0.053)         (0.062)         (0.051)         (0.230)    
Pos Output gap * Presidential              -0.085          -0.157**        -0.085          -0.136    
                                          (0.064)         (0.079)         (0.061)         (0.246)    
Neg Output gap * Majoritarian               0.015           0.036           0.015          -0.118    
                                          (0.039)         (0.053)         (0.037)         (0.123)    
Pos Output gap * Majoritarian              -0.062***       -0.020          -0.062***       -0.246*   
                                          (0.019)         (0.030)         (0.018)         (0.127)    
Neg Output gap * Union Coverage            -0.001          -0.001          -0.001          -0.003*   
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Pos Output gap * Union Coverage            -0.001**        -0.001          -0.001**        -0.003*   
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Election                                   -0.006          -0.011          -0.006           0.034    
                                          (0.026)         (0.023)         (0.025)         (0.046)    
Election * Presidential                     0.126**         0.153***        0.126**         0.055    
                                          (0.058)         (0.051)         (0.056)         (0.138)    
Election * Press                            0.005*          0.005*          0.005*         -0.003    
                                          (0.002)         (0.003)         (0.002)         (0.007)    
Election * Majoritarian                    -0.028          -0.004          -0.028          -0.007    
                                          (0.062)         (0.050)         (0.059)         (0.105)    
Election * Union Coverage                  -0.003*         -0.002*         -0.003**        -0.003    
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Pop below 15                                0.032           0.034           0.032           0.025    
                                          (0.022)         (0.032)         (0.021)         (0.041)    
Pop over 65                                 0.015           0.015           0.015           0.016    
                                          (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.016)         (0.043)    
d 2009                                     -0.141**        -0.179**        -0.141***       -0.184    
                                          (0.057)         (0.073)         (0.055)         (0.126)    
Constant                                   -0.625          -0.642          -0.624          -0.443    
                                          (0.605)         (0.767)         (0.584)         (1.166)    
R²                                          0.307                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.270                                                    
Obs.                                          382             353             353             325    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i. 
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Table 17: Correlation between long fiscal drifts and shocks interacted with institutions (using the World 
Bank corruption index for transparency) 
                                                                                                 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Long Fiscal Drift                    0.598***        0.566***        0.598***        0.320**  
                                          (0.038)         (0.038)         (0.037)         (0.124)    
Neg Output gap                             -0.001          -0.005          -0.001           0.004    
                                          (0.010)         (0.012)         (0.010)         (0.051)    
Pos Output gap                              0.038***        0.032**         0.038***        0.083*   
                                          (0.013)         (0.014)         (0.012)         (0.049)    
Neg Output gap * WBTransparency            -0.019           0.015          -0.019          -0.094*   
                                          (0.016)         (0.018)         (0.015)         (0.048)    
Pos Output gap * WBTransparency            -0.051**        -0.025          -0.051***       -0.107**  
                                          (0.020)         (0.025)         (0.020)         (0.047)    
Neg Output gap * Presidential               0.012           0.081*          0.012           0.147    
                                          (0.038)         (0.042)         (0.036)         (0.221)    
Pos Output gap * Presidential               0.063           0.156**         0.063           0.307    
                                          (0.072)         (0.072)         (0.069)         (0.240)    
Neg Output gap * Majoritarian               0.037           0.039           0.037           0.236**  
                                          (0.028)         (0.028)         (0.027)         (0.116)    
Pos Output gap * Majoritarian               0.014           0.028           0.014           0.141    
                                          (0.037)         (0.039)         (0.035)         (0.109)    
Neg Output gap * Union Coverage             0.000           0.001           0.001           0.002    
                                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.002)    
Pos Output gap * Union Coverage             0.001*          0.001           0.001*          0.001    
                                          (0.000)         (0.001)         (0.000)         (0.002)    
Election                                    0.009           0.011           0.009           0.016    
                                          (0.021)         (0.023)         (0.020)         (0.042)    
Election * Presidential                    -0.205***       -0.198***       -0.205***       -0.250*   
                                          (0.052)         (0.052)         (0.049)         (0.134)    
Election * WBTransparency                  -0.067***       -0.062***       -0.067***       -0.076    
                                          (0.022)         (0.020)         (0.021)         (0.061)    
Election * Majoritarian                     0.093**         0.081*          0.093***        0.049    
                                          (0.034)         (0.041)         (0.033)         (0.099)    
Election * Union Coverage                   0.002***        0.002**         0.002***        0.002    
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Pop below 15                               -0.039*         -0.069***       -0.039**        -0.036    
                                          (0.020)         (0.018)         (0.019)         (0.038)    
Pop over 65                                -0.023          -0.045***       -0.023           0.005    
                                          (0.017)         (0.016)         (0.017)         (0.040)    
d 2009                                      0.117***        0.025           0.118***        0.270**  
                                          (0.042)         (0.050)         (0.040)         (0.121)    
Constant                                    1.058*          1.935***        1.061**         0.584    
                                          (0.560)         (0.484)         (0.540)         (1.078)    
R²                                          0.400                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.368                                                    
Obs.                                          382             353             353             325    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i. 
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Table 18: Correlation between long fiscal tightenings and shocks interacted with institutions (using the 
World Bank corruption index for transparency) 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Long Fiscal Tight                    0.460***        0.474***        0.460***        0.186    
                                          (0.040)         (0.043)         (0.038)         (0.118)    
Neg Output gap                             -0.001          -0.007          -0.001          -0.011    
                                          (0.015)         (0.019)         (0.014)         (0.056)    
Pos Output gap                             -0.043***       -0.062***       -0.043***       -0.055    
                                          (0.012)         (0.019)         (0.012)         (0.054)    
Neg Output gap * WBTransparency             0.028           0.043*          0.028          -0.001    
                                          (0.022)         (0.023)         (0.021)         (0.054)    
Pos Output gap * WBTransparency            -0.001           0.015          -0.001          -0.047    
                                          (0.019)         (0.020)         (0.018)         (0.052)    
Neg Output gap * Presidential              -0.038          -0.067          -0.038          -0.061    
                                          (0.057)         (0.065)         (0.054)         (0.236)    
Pos Output gap * Presidential              -0.075          -0.141*         -0.075          -0.160    
                                          (0.065)         (0.084)         (0.062)         (0.258)    
Neg Output gap * Majoritarian               0.002           0.017           0.003          -0.132    
                                          (0.037)         (0.047)         (0.036)         (0.122)    
Pos Output gap * Majoritarian              -0.057***       -0.018          -0.057***       -0.227*   
                                          (0.018)         (0.028)         (0.017)         (0.128)    
Neg Output gap * Union Coverage            -0.001          -0.001          -0.001          -0.003    
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Pos Output gap * Union Coverage            -0.001**        -0.001*         -0.001***       -0.003    
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Election                                   -0.006          -0.012          -0.006           0.036    
                                          (0.026)         (0.023)         (0.025)         (0.046)    
Election * Presidential                     0.129*          0.161***        0.129**         0.034    
                                          (0.065)         (0.054)         (0.062)         (0.145)    
Election * WBTransparency                   0.043           0.053           0.043          -0.030    
                                          (0.037)         (0.037)         (0.036)         (0.067)    
Election * Majoritarian                    -0.056          -0.033          -0.056          -0.003    
                                          (0.069)         (0.058)         (0.066)         (0.108)    
Election * Union Coverage                  -0.003*         -0.002*         -0.003**        -0.003    
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Pop below 15                                0.031           0.037           0.031           0.024    
                                          (0.022)         (0.033)         (0.021)         (0.041)    
Pop over 65                                 0.015           0.018           0.015           0.014    
                                          (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.016)         (0.044)    
d 2009                                     -0.151**        -0.193**        -0.151***       -0.190    
                                          (0.057)         (0.075)         (0.055)         (0.127)    
Constant                                    -0.620          -0.747          -0.619          -0.387    
                                          (0.607)         (0.775)         (0.588)         (1.170)    
R²                                          0.307                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.270                                                    
Obs.                                          382             353             353             325    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i. 
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Table 19: Correlation between long fiscal drifts and shocks (considering output gaps of +/- 1% and over) 
 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Long Fiscal Drift                    0.589***        0.552***        0.517***        0.291**  
                                          (0.032)         (0.042)         (0.041)         (0.113)    
Neg Output gap                             -0.003           0.003           0.002           0.027    
                                          (0.008)         (0.011)         (0.010)         (0.038)    
Pos Output gap                              0.038***        0.031**         0.037***        0.077*** 
                                          (0.012)         (0.014)         (0.013)         (0.028)    
Election                                    0.003           0.011           0.005           0.019    
                                          (0.034)         (0.036)         (0.033)         (0.031)    
Pop below 15                               -0.032          -0.069***       -0.030          -0.017    
                                          (0.019)         (0.021)         (0.025)         (0.025)    
Pop over 65                                -0.023          -0.058***       -0.042*         -0.044*   
                                          (0.021)         (0.016)         (0.025)         (0.026)    
d 2009                                      0.120***       -0.002           0.094**         0.195*   
                                          (0.040)         (0.052)         (0.044)         (0.104)    
Constant                                    0.936           2.134***        1.180           0.950    
                                          (0.622)         (0.576)         (0.775)         (0.747)    
R²                                          0.351                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.339                                                    
Obs.                                          387             375             375             362    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i  . 
 
 
 
Table 20: Correlation between long fiscal tightenings and shocks (considering output gaps of +/- 1% 
and over) 
 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Long Fiscal Tight                    0.461***        0.491***        0.479***        0.189**  
                                          (0.038)         (0.032)         (0.033)         (0.093)    
Neg Output gap                             -0.003          -0.004          -0.008          -0.048    
                                          (0.013)         (0.017)         (0.014)         (0.046)    
Pos Output gap                             -0.039***       -0.046***       -0.042***       -0.065*   
                                          (0.013)         (0.017)         (0.014)         (0.035)    
Election                                   -0.009          -0.009          -0.006          -0.020    
                                          (0.032)         (0.029)         (0.031)         (0.038)    
Pop below 15                                0.021           0.043           0.030           0.018    
                                          (0.020)         (0.033)         (0.022)         (0.032)    
Pop over 65                                 0.005           0.013           0.016           0.017    
                                          (0.016)         (0.022)         (0.022)         (0.032)    
d 2009                                     -0.154**        -0.155**        -0.146**        -0.131    
                                          (0.059)         (0.077)         (0.066)         (0.129)    
Constant                                   -0.294          -0.829          -0.615          -0.311    
                                          (0.551)         (0.843)         (0.646)         (0.911)    
R²                                          0.273                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.260                                                    
Obs.                                          387             375             375             362    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i  . 
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Table 21: Correlation between long fiscal drifts and shocks (considering output gaps of +/- 1% and over) 
interacted with institutions  (Using the Transparency International index for transparency) 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Long Fiscal Drift                    0.597***        0.564***        0.597***        0.270*   
                                          (0.038)         (0.037)         (0.037)         (0.161)    
Neg Output gap                             -0.001          -0.004          -0.001           0.046    
                                          (0.009)         (0.012)         (0.009)         (0.067)    
Pos Output gap                              0.038***        0.034**         0.038***        0.116*   
                                          (0.013)         (0.014)         (0.012)         (0.065)    
Neg Output gap * Transparency              -0.002           0.009          -0.002          -0.035    
                                          (0.006)         (0.006)         (0.005)         (0.023)    
Pos Output gap * Transparency              -0.018**        -0.010          -0.018**        -0.044**  
                                          (0.008)         (0.009)         (0.007)         (0.022)    
Neg Output gap * Presidential               0.023           0.089**         0.023           0.428    
                                          (0.037)         (0.039)         (0.036)         (0.308)    
Pos Output gap * Presidential               0.065           0.148**         0.065           0.548*   
                                          (0.072)         (0.073)         (0.069)         (0.313)    
Neg Output gap * Majoritarian               0.029           0.029           0.029           0.195    
                                          (0.024)         (0.023)         (0.023)         (0.131)    
Pos Output gap * Majoritarian               0.019           0.029           0.019           0.159    
                                          (0.033)         (0.036)         (0.032)         (0.131)    
Neg Output gap * Union Coverage             0.000           0.000           0.000           0.002    
                                          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.002)    
Pos Output gap * Union Coverage             0.001*          0.001           0.001*          0.001    
                                          (0.000)         (0.001)         (0.000)         (0.002)    
Election                                    0.007           0.008           0.007           0.011    
                                          (0.020)         (0.022)         (0.019)         (0.053)    
Election * Presidential                    -0.206***       -0.194***       -0.206***       -0.287*   
                                          (0.053)         (0.055)         (0.051)         (0.174)    
Election * Transparency                    -0.024***       -0.021**        -0.024***       -0.024    
                                          (0.009)         (0.009)         (0.008)         (0.030)    
Election * Majoritarian                     0.088**         0.075*          0.088***        0.042    
                                          (0.035)         (0.042)         (0.034)         (0.129)    
Election * Union Coverage                   0.002**         0.002**         0.002***        0.001    
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.003)    
Pop below 15                               -0.040*         -0.068***       -0.040**        -0.055    
                                          (0.020)         (0.018)         (0.019)         (0.049)    
Pop over 65                                -0.021          -0.044***       -0.021           0.027    
                                          (0.018)         (0.016)         (0.017)         (0.051)    
d 2009                                      0.112**         0.023           0.112***        0.191    
                                          (0.042)         (0.049)         (0.041)         (0.157)    
Constant                                    1.059*          1.909***        1.061*          0.566    
                                          (0.565)         (0.477)         (0.543)         (1.328)    
R²                                          0.401                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.369                                                    
Obs.                                          382             353             353             325    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i   
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Table 22: Correlation between long fiscal tightenings and shocks (considering output gaps of +/- 1% 
and over) interacted with institutions  (Using the Transparency International index for transparency) 
                                                I              II             III              IV    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged Long Fiscal Tight                    0.461***        0.477***        0.461***       -0.031    
                                          (0.040)         (0.043)         (0.039)         (0.170)    
Neg Output gap                              0.003          -0.001           0.003          -0.077    
                                          (0.013)         (0.018)         (0.013)         (0.072)    
Pos Output gap                             -0.036***       -0.054***       -0.036***       -0.105    
                                          (0.011)         (0.017)         (0.011)         (0.068)    
Neg Output gap * Transparency               0.008           0.012           0.008           0.007    
                                          (0.008)         (0.008)         (0.008)         (0.024)    
Pos Output gap * Transparency               0.001           0.006           0.001          -0.004    
                                          (0.006)         (0.006)         (0.006)         (0.022)    
Neg Output gap * Presidential              -0.058          -0.085          -0.058          -0.275    
                                          (0.051)         (0.059)         (0.049)         (0.304)    
Pos Output gap * Presidential              -0.075          -0.131*         -0.075          -0.351    
                                          (0.060)         (0.075)         (0.057)         (0.310)    
Neg Output gap * Majoritarian               0.005           0.019           0.005          -0.125    
                                          (0.030)         (0.043)         (0.029)         (0.129)    
Pos Output gap * Majoritarian              -0.052**        -0.017          -0.052***       -0.278*   
                                          (0.019)         (0.026)         (0.018)         (0.149)    
Neg Output gap * Union Coverage            -0.001          -0.001          -0.001          -0.003*   
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
Pos Output gap * Union Coverage            -0.001***       -0.001*         -0.001***       -0.004*   
                                          (0.000)         (0.001)         (0.000)         (0.002)    
Election                                   -0.004          -0.009          -0.004           0.037    
                                          (0.026)         (0.023)         (0.025)         (0.054)    
Election * Presidential                     0.134*          0.169***        0.134**         0.070    
                                          (0.069)         (0.058)         (0.066)         (0.178)    
Election * Transparency                     0.018           0.022           0.018          -0.013    
                                          (0.015)         (0.014)         (0.014)         (0.031)    
Election * Majoritarian                    -0.060          -0.038          -0.060           0.028    
                                          (0.070)         (0.060)         (0.067)         (0.133)    
Election * Union Coverage                  -0.003*         -0.002*         -0.003**        -0.002    
                                          (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.003)    
Pop below 15                                0.034           0.038           0.034           0.046    
                                          (0.023)         (0.034)         (0.022)         (0.049)    
Pop over 65                                 0.014           0.015           0.014           0.016    
                                          (0.018)         (0.018)         (0.017)         (0.054)    
d 2009                                     -0.150**        -0.191**        -0.150***       -0.094    
                                          (0.057)         (0.075)         (0.054)         (0.161)    
Constant                                   -0.670          -0.747          -0.669          -0.686    
                                          (0.629)         (0.811)         (0.609)         (1.378)    
R²                                          0.303                                                    
Adj. R²                                     0.267                                                    
Obs.                                          382             353             353             325    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
I: OLS with country fixed effects.  
II: Arellano-Bond method;  
III: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values;  
IV: Arellano-Bond method where the output gap of country i  is instrumented by the average output gap all OECD countries but country i   
 
 
44 
 
Table 23: Correlation between long fiscal drifts and shocks interacted with institutions (using the Transparency International index for transparency) 
excluding countries are removed one by one. 
 
Country 
removed from 
panel 
Neg Output 
gap                              
 
Pos Output gap                               Pos Output gap
* Transparency               
Pos Output 
gap * Union
Coverage                                 
Election * 
Presidential                     
Election *  
Transparency                     
Election *  
Union 
Coverage                    
AUS         
AUT         
BEL         
CAN         
CHE         
CHL         
CZE         
DEU         
DNK         
ESP         
EST         
FIN        
FRA         
GBR         
GRC         
HUN         
IRL         
ISL         
ISR         
ITA         
JPN         
KOR         
LUX         
MEX         
NLD         
NOR         
NZL         
POL         
PRT         
SVK         
SVN         
SWE         
TUR         
USA  
 
-0.002          
-0.001          
-0.001          
-0.001                
0.001         
-0.002          
-0.000          
-0.001          
-0.001          
-0.000          
-0.002          
-0.001          
-0.001          
-0.005          
-0.002          
-0.002          
-0.000          
-0.006          
-0.002          
-0.001           
0.000           
0.007          
-0.003          
-0.003           
0.000          
-0.004          
-0.002           
0.000          
-0.002          
-0.005          
-0.002          
-0.001          
-0.002          
-0.003    
 
0.038***        
0.039***        
0.037***        
0.038***        
0.039***        
0.038***        
0.038***        
0.039***        
0.040***        
0.038***        
0.038***        
0.041***        
0.037***        
0.034***        
0.036***        
0.036***        
0.041***        
0.037***        
0.038***        
0.038***        
0.043***        
0.048***        
0.040***        
0.035***        
0.038***        
0.042***        
0.039***        
0.037***        
0.036***        
0.032***        
0.038***        
0.041***        
0.037***        
0.033*** 
-0.021***       
-0.021***       
-0.019***       
-0.022***       
-0.020***       
-0.021***       
-0.024***       
-0.020***       
-0.021***       
-0.020***       
-0.021***       
-0.020***       
-0.021***       
-0.022***       
-0.019**        
-0.021***       
-0.020***       
-0.022***       
-0.021***       
-0.023***       
-0.019**        
-0.022***       
-0.020***       
-0.020***       
-0.021***       
-0.020***       
-0.021***       
-0.020***       
-0.020***       
-0.014*         
-0.021***       
-0.020***       
-0.021***       
-0.024*** 
0.001*          
0.001**         
0.001           
0.001**         
0.001*          
0.001*          
0.001*          
0.001*          
0.001*          
0.001*          
0.001*          
0.001*          
0.001*          
0.001**         
0.001**         
0.001*          
0.001           
0.001*          
0.001*          
0.001**         
0.001           
0.001*          
0.001*          
0.001*          
0.001*          
0.001*          
0.001*          
0.001*          
0.001*          
0.001**         
0.001*          
0.001**         
0.001*          
0.001** 
-0.208***       
-0.201***       
-0.209***       
-0.180***       
-0.203***       
-0.208***       
-0.198***       
-0.209***       
-0.209***       
-0.210***       
-0.208***       
-0.206***       
-0.208***       
-0.234***       
-0.191***       
-0.207***       
-0.219***       
-0.207***       
-0.208***       
-0.214***       
-0.185***       
-0.217***       
-0.208***       
-0.205***       
-0.215***       
-0.207***       
-0.208***       
-0.232***       
-0.227***       
-0.229***       
-0.208***       
-0.207***       
-0.208***       
-0.188*** 
-0.025***       
-0.025***       
-0.027***       
-0.028***       
-0.027***       
-0.025***       
-0.023***       
-0.025***       
-0.025***       
-0.023***       
-0.025***       
-0.024***       
-0.024***       
-0.024***       
-0.020***       
-0.025***       
-0.025***       
-0.025***       
-0.025***       
-0.028***       
-0.024***       
-0.026***       
-0.025***       
-0.025***       
-0.028***       
-0.025***       
-0.025***       
-0.023**        
-0.028***       
-0.030***       
-0.025***       
-0.025***       
-0.025***       
-0.024** 
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002*          
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002***        
0.002*** 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values.  
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Table 24: Correlation between long fiscal drifts and shocks interacted with institutions (using the Transparency International index for transparency) 
excluding countries are removed one by one. 
 
Country 
removed from 
panel 
Neg Output 
gap                              
 
Pos Output gap                               Pos Output gap
* Transparency               
Pos Output gap * 
Union Coverage                                 
Election * 
Presidential     
Election *  
Transparency                     
Election *  
Union 
Coverage                    
AUS         
AUT         
BEL         
CAN         
CHE         
CHL         
CZE         
DEU         
DNK         
ESP         
EST         
FIN        
FRA         
GBR         
GRC         
HUN         
IRL         
ISL         
ISR         
ITA         
JPN         
KOR         
LUX         
MEX         
NLD         
NOR         
NZL         
POL         
PRT         
SVK         
SVN         
SWE         
TUR         
USA  
 
-0.000          
-0.004              
0.002           
0.001          
-0.007          
-0.000           
0.004          
-0.001          
-0.001           
0.003          
-0.000           
0.002          
-0.003          
-0.002          
-0.001           
0.006          
-0.002          
-0.002          
-0.000           
0.001          
-0.008          
-0.001           
0.000           
0.001          
-0.003           
0.001           
0.001           
0.003           
0.002          
-0.004          
-0.000          
-0.003          
-0.000           
0.001 
-0.043***       
-0.045***       
-0.043***       
-0.042***       
-0.042***       
-0.043***       
-0.040***       
-0.042***       
-0.044***       
-0.042***       
-0.043***       
-0.045***       
-0.040***       
-0.042***       
-0.044***       
-0.043***       
-0.045***       
-0.045***       
-0.043***       
-0.042***       
-0.043***       
-0.046***       
-0.046***       
-0.044***       
-0.038***       
-0.051***       
-0.040***       
-0.040***       
-0.042***       
-0.042***       
-0.043***       
-0.046***       
-0.043***       
-0.035*** 
0.002           
0.003           
0.000           
0.002           
0.003           
0.002           
0.000           
0.002           
0.001          
-0.001           
0.002           
0.001           
0.001           
0.001           
0.002           
0.002           
0.002           
0.001           
0.002           
0.002           
0.001           
0.002           
0.001           
0.003           
0.004          
-0.001           
0.003           
0.002           
0.001           
0.000           
0.002           
0.001           
0.002           
0.007 
-0.001***       
-0.002***       
-0.001***       
-0.001***       
-0.002***       
-0.001***       
-0.002***       
-0.001***       
-0.001***       
-0.001**        
-0.001***       
-0.002***       
-0.001**        
-0.001***       
-0.001***       
-0.001***       
-0.001***       
-0.002***       
-0.001***       
-0.002**        
-0.001**        
-0.001***       
-0.001***       
-0.001***       
-0.001***       
-0.001***       
-0.002***       
-0.001***       
-0.001***       
-0.002***       
-0.001***       
-0.002***       
-0.001***       
-0.002*** 
 
0.134**         
0.148**         
0.137**         
0.143**         
0.115*          
0.134**         
0.172***        
0.132**         
0.133**         
0.128**         
0.134**         
0.139**         
0.140**         
0.135**         
0.141**         
0.105*          
0.144**         
0.125**         
0.134**         
0.118*          
0.149**         
0.138**         
0.134**         
0.153***        
0.136**         
0.132**         
0.135*          
0.071           
0.127**         
0.139*          
0.134**         
0.126**         
0.134**         
0.144 
0.019           
0.020           
0.016           
0.017           
0.024*          
0.019           
0.027**         
0.019           
0.019           
0.018           
0.019           
0.020           
0.029**         
0.018           
0.021           
0.015           
0.018           
0.016           
0.019           
0.010           
0.020           
0.020           
0.019           
0.013           
0.020           
0.018           
0.020           
0.023*          
0.018           
0.020           
0.019           
0.017           
0.019           
0.022    
 
-0.003**        
-0.002*         
-0.002*         
-0.002*         
-0.003**        
-0.003**        
-0.002*         
-0.003**        
-0.003**        
-0.003**        
-0.003**        
-0.002*         
-0.004**        
-0.003**        
-0.003**        
-0.003**        
-0.002*         
-0.003**        
-0.003**        
-0.002**        
-0.002*         
-0.003**        
-0.003**        
-0.003**        
-0.003**        
-0.003**        
-0.003**        
-0.003**        
-0.003**        
-0.003**        
-0.003**        
-0.003**        
-0.003**        
-0.003** 
Note : * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Period 1995-2009.  
Arellano-Bond method where the output gap is instrumented by its lagged values.  
 
